MAPP V. OHIO, decided on 20 June 1961, was a landmark court case originating in Cleveland, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under the 4th and 14th Constitutional amendments, illegally seized evidence could not be used in a state criminal trial. This decision significantly changed state law-enforcement procedures throughout the country. The case began on 23 May 1957 when police officers entered the Cleveland home of Dollree Mapp looking for a person wanted for questioning in a recent bombing and seeking illegal gambling paraphernalia. After a thorough search, the police found neither the person nor the gambling materials. However, they did find obscene material, which Mapp denied owning. Possession of obscene materials was then illegal according to state law, and Mapp was arrested. In the fall of 1958, she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 1-7 years in the penitentiary. No search warrant was produced at the trial, nor was the failure to produce one accounted for. Mapp's lawyer, Alexander L. Kearns, appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court on the basis that Ohio's obscenity law violated the right to privacy, and only secondarily that the conduct of the police in obtaining the evidence was unconstitutional. The court affirmed the conviction, and despite the absence of a search warrant, also ruled that illegally seized evidence could be entered in a criminal trial. Show Kearns appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that Mapp's conviction violated her constitutional rights. At the invitation of the Court, Cleveland attorney Bernard A. Berkman, representing the American Civil Liberties Union, also submitted a brief. During the oral argument, he urged the high court to examine the constitutionality of search-and-seizure usage in state courts, since federal courts prohibited the use of illegally obtained evidence. The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision overturned Mapp's conviction, on the grounds that evidence seized without a search warrant cannot be used in state criminal prosecutions under the 4th Amendment to the Constitution, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the 14th Amendment, which extends that protection to state jurisdictions. Article Categories Law The exclusionary rule prevents the government from using most evidence gathered in violation of the United States Constitution. The decision in Mapp v. Ohio established that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence gained from an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona established that the exclusionary rule applies to improperly elicited self-incriminatory statements gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and to evidence gained in situations where the government violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, the rule does not apply in civil cases, including deportation hearings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. Derivatives of Excluded EvidenceIf evidence that falls within the scope of the exclusionary rule led law enforcement to other evidence, which they would not otherwise have located, then the exclusionary rule applies to the newly discovered evidence, subject to a few exceptions. The secondarily excluded evidence is called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Though the rationale behind the exclusionary rule is based in constitutional rights, it is a court-created remedy and deterrent, not an independent constitutional right. The purpose of the rule is to deter law enforcement officers from conducting searches or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment and to provide remedies to defendants whose rights have been infringed. Courts have also carved out several exceptions to the exclusionary rule where the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent or remedial benefits. For example, the good-faith exception, below, does not trigger the rule because excluding the evidence would not deter police officers from violating the law in the future. ExceptionsGood Faith Exception Under the good-faith exception, evidence is not excluded if it is obtained by officers who reasonably rely on a search warrant that turns out to be invalid. See Arizona v. Evans. Also, in Davis v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police conduct a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent allowing the search. Under Illinois v. Krull, evidence may be admissible if the officers rely on a statute that is later invalidated. In Herring v. U.S., the Court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when police employees erred in maintaining records in a warrant database. Independent Source Doctrine Evidence initially obtained during an unlawful search or seizure may later be admissible if the evidence is later obtained through a constitutionally valid search or seizure. Murray v. U.S. is the modern interpretation of the independent source doctrine, originally adopted in Nix v. Williams. Additionally, some courts recognize an "expanded" doctrine, in which a partially tainted warrant is upheld if, after excluding the tainted information that lead to its issuance, the remaining untainted information establishes probable cause sufficient to justify its issuance. See, for example, the South Dakota Supreme Court decision in State v. Boll. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Related to the independent source doctrine, above, and also adopted in Nix v. Williams, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows admission of evidence that was discovered in an unlawful search or seizure if it would have be discovered in the same condition anyway, by an independent line of investigation that was already being pursued when the unlawful search or seizure occurred. Attenuation Doctrine In cases where the relationship between the evidence challenged and the unconstitutional conduct is too remote and attenuated, the evidence may be admissible. See Utah v. Strieff. Brown v. Illinois, cited in Strieff, articulated three factors for the courts to consider when determining attenuation: temporal proximity, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Evidence Admissible for Impeachment The exclusionary rule does not prevent the government from introducing illegally gathered evidence to “impeach,” or attack the credibility of, defendants’ testimony at trial. The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Harris v. New York as a truth-testing device to prevent perjury. Even when the government suspects perjury, however, it may only use tainted evidence for impeachment, and may not use it to show guilt. Qualified Immunity Due to qualified immunity, the exclusionary rule is often a defendant's only remedy when police officers conduct an unreasonable search or violate their Miranda rights. Even if officers violate a defendant's constitutional or statutory rights, qualified immunity protects the officers from a lawsuit unless no reasonable officer would believe that the officers' conduct was legal. Which of the following is an exception to the exclusionary rule?Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule are "attenuation of the taint," "independent source," and "inevitable discovery."
Which of the following is an exception to the exclusionary rule supported by the Supreme Court quizlet?The exclusionary rule means that evidence illegally seized cannot be used in a trial. Therefore, the exclusionary rule requires law enforcement to obtain said evidence legally. Two exceptions to the exclusionary rule are the good-faith exception and the clerical errors exception.
What is the goodThe good-faith exception applies to police officers who act in good faith on either a facially valid warrant later determined to be invalid or an existing law later declared unconstitutional. Good faith is limited to the objective good faith of a reasonable police officer.
Which 1960s US Supreme Court dramatically changed the day to day practice of American policing?In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained criminal suspects, prior to police questioning, must be informed of their constitutional right to an attorney and against self-incrimination.
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