What are the political implications of recent demographic trends in Texas

Ten Democratic presidential candidates are converging in Houston this week for the third presidential primary debate, bringing increased attention to the question of whether the eventual nominee has any chance of winning the state’s hefty 38 electoral votes in 2020. Texas has been reliably Republican in presidential elections since 1980, but recent trends have indicated the state’s politics might be on the move again.

Texas has the fastest-growing population in the U.S., and the influx is not increasing the state’s traditionally white, Christian, Republican population. In 2018, for every white person who arrived in Texas, nearly nine Hispanics relocated to the state. While Hispanic populations are not monolithic in their views or voting habits, and they typically vote at lower rates than white residents, the increasing minority population typically leans Democratic. Plus, Texas Hispanics are starting to vote at higher rates, and the 2018 Senate election featured Democrat Beto O’Rourke finishing only 2.5% behind incumbent Republican Sen. Ted Cruz.

Despite the documented change in the Texas population, opinions on key issues that divide Democrats and Republicans have not moved in the last few years. PRRI’s American Values Atlas has tracked opinion on LGBT issues and abortion opinions over the last 5 years, and there is little change in Texans’ overall views. In 2014, 67% of Texans favored laws that would protect gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people against discrimination in jobs, public accommodations, and housing. That proportion was exactly the same in 2018 – 67%. In 2014, 49% of Texans said abortion should be legal in most or all cases. In 2018, the number was 48%.

However, topline numbers can obscure key changes in subgroups. By race, the numbers have not changed substantially, and Hispanic and Latino views on these issues are more mixed than their voting habits might indicate. But the movement of the population is sometimes evident in other ways. For example, on the LGBT discrimination question, the proportion of Texans living in suburbs who favor discrimination protections jumped from 57% in 2014 to 67% in 2018. Rural Texans became less supportive, which allowed the topline number to remain the same.

Our American Values Atlas also tracks demographic shifts that would change the state of politics in Texas, and there are certainly some of these forces at work. The state is becoming less white, as the Census data shows, and PRRI data show that trend as most pronounced in the suburban areas of the state. The suburbs were 56% white in the 2018 survey, down from 62% in 2014.

Another trend with political implications is shifting religious affiliations. Statewide, the number of religiously “unaffiliated” residents is increasing, up to 22% in 2018 from 18% in 2014. Again, this is most pronounced in the suburbs, which are up to 22% unaffiliated from 16% in 2014. Although the religiously unaffiliated is a broad group with a variety of political leanings, they lean more liberal than conservative.

The movement of both race and religious affiliation trends in the Texas suburbs is important to 2020 election considerations. The suburbs are expected to be a battleground within each state, regardless of whether that state is a battleground. Suburbs have typically been more reliably Republican in most areas of the country, but population changes are bringing more racial, religious, and political diversity.

Sample sizes and margins of error vary from subgroup to subgroup, from year to year and from state to state. You can see the sample size for the estimates in this chart on rollover or in the last column of the table. And visit to see approximate margins of error for a group of a given size. Readers should always bear in mind the approximate margin of error for the group they are examining when making comparisons with other groups or assessing the significance of trends over time. For full question wording, see the survey questionnaire.

Demographics are not destiny, but steady and predictable changes to the electorate play an important role in defining the landscape of American politics. Most demographic groups have a political lean, so a group increasing or decreasing in size over time will tend to benefit one party or type of politics over another. The most well-known example is the growth of the nonwhite population in the United States, which—since nonwhites tend to lean heavily Democratic—is typically viewed as tilting the electoral terrain somewhat toward the Democrats over time as well as increasing the weight of nonwhite voters within the Democratic Party over time. But other changes are important, such as the decline of noncollege educated voters, particularly whites; the aging of the adult population; and the rise of new generations to replace older ones.

William H. Frey

Senior Fellow - Brookings Metro

Ruy Teixeira

Former Brookings Expert

Senior Fellow - Center for American Progress

In this report, we will explore the effect of these changes on the demographic composition of the electorate and, especially, on the composition of the two major political parties. Reflecting the latter focus, this analysis will not focus on how many individuals from a given demographic group voted or will likely vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate in a particular election. Rather, it focuses on how many people who voted or are likely to vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate in a particular election belong to a given demographic group.

While the former tells us about the political leanings of a given group, the latter answers different questions. While size is not the sole determinant of a group’s influence within a party, it is a significant input and affects how parties formulate positions and present themselves to the electorate. As we head into the 2020 presidential primaries, we are bound to observe the effects of party composition on how candidates for the presidential nomination—especially Democratic candidates, due to their intense competition for voters—position themselves to garner primary votes from different demographic groups within their party.

Our investigation turns up a number of key findings that illuminate how significantly the compositions of the Democratic and Republican parties have changed over the years and are likely to change in the future. We show that the 2016 election was the most graphically divisive election in the past 36 years. The parties were more divided by age, race, and education than in any prior election in modern political history.

Reflecting these intensifying divisions, the parties were more compositionally different in 2016 than at any point in the prior 36 years. This election was the first presidential election white noncollege voters did not make up a plurality of both parties’ coalitions, with white college voters exceeding the share of white noncollege voters in the Democratic coalition. Nonwhites will continue to grow as a share of both parties’ coalitions, especially Hispanics. We find that, by 2032, Hispanic voters will surpass black voters as the largest overall nonwhite voting group. And, by 2036, black voters will make up a larger share of the Democratic coalition than white noncollege voters. On the other hand, we find that white voters will continue to decline through 2036 as a share of both the Republican and Democratic party coalitions, though this decline with be considerably quicker in fast-growing states such as Arizona and Texas that are already less white.

White noncollege voters, in particular, are projected to decline rapidly as a share of both parties’ coalitions across all states through 2036, although the sharpest declines will, again, be in fast-growing states. Generational changes will also be substantial. By 2036, Millennial and Generation Z voters—the two youngest generations—will be heavily represented in both the Democratic Party and Republican Party coalitions, while the influence of Baby Boomer and the Silent Generation voters—the two oldest generations—will radically decline. White Millennial and Generation Z voters, in particular, will develop a large presence in the Republican coalition and, combined with nonwhites, will give the GOP a new look in all states—even slowgrowing ones such as Wisconsin and Ohio.

Finally, our data indicate that, while shifting turnout and support rates can be pivotal for winning elections, these changes are likely to have a relatively small impact on the overall makeup of the electorate and party coalitions in the future. Thus, most of the effect of demographic change on future party coalitions is already baked in and will reshape party coalitions—in a sense, whether these parties like it or not.

Which of the following describes one of the political implications of recent demographic changes in Texas quizlet?

How are the demographics of Texas changing?

What is the political stance in Texas?

What is the demographic breakdown of Texas?